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***Kant – A World-Citizen from Königsberg***

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Precisely at the pinnacle of the European Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant applied a central theme of his age, critique, to two other central themes of the epoch, reason and freedom. In so doing, he subjected the Enlightenment to a radical self-criticism. By shedding light on the Enlightenment (eine Aufklärung über Aufklärung), he undertook what to this day is a paradigmatic self-enlightenment. At the foundation are his famous questions: 1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. What may I hope?

### *1.1. Cosmopolitanism*

Cosmopolitanism immediately lends itself to the connection of philosophy with politics. According to today's perception, someone is able to claim the honorary title of "cosmopolite" or "world citizen" who is able to cross national, and in addition ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and perhaps even religious boundaries. In this sense, we today employ the term cosmopolitan in a political sense. However, since its origins philosophy has understood the term in a far broader sense. The reason is obvious because the cognitive foundation for philosophy, wherever it is found and is developed, constitutes no ethnically bound (for example, Eurocentric) capacity. Its driving force as well as medium is that general, human reason that crosses all political borders.

This reason is thoroughly connected with experience. Even for Kant, the great advocate of the synthetic a priori, philosophy is by no means concerned exclusively with some pre-empirical thinking. The experience to which philosophy appeals is concerned with universal, human experience. Even when philosophy defends singular rights (for example, the right of small social units), in doing so it employs arguments that are universal in order to be convincing.

Although in essence philosophy transgresses all particular boundaries, none of its famous representatives is comprehensively cosmopolitan. The one and only standard-bearer exception is Kant. His unique status begins with the fact that all Eurocentric arrogance is absent in his work. To the extent that the philosopher is concerned with Europe whatsoever, he is interested above all for internal differences – in the lecture *Physical Geography*, he is interested in internal,

geographical differences, and in the *Anthropology* (VII 316 f.), he is interested in differences of mentality. In both cases, he is concerned with Europe's richness of variety rather than having a concern for what it uniquely holds in common and would allow the continent to place itself at the center of the world (i.e., to think Eurocentrically and to develop this feeling of Eurocentrism in terms of a feeling of superiority).

Rather than Kant's thought reflecting Eurocentric superiority, its extraordinariness is manifest by a universal cosmopolitanism by which, in contrast to the way it was frequently conceived in his epoch (see, for example, Cavallar 2005, Cheneval 2002, Coulmas 1990, and Kleingeld 1999) as limited to economics and on occasion as extended to politics, he gives the term a far more comprehensive and fundamental as well as in many respects, new meaning. Cosmopolitanism is one of the driving forces that shape his entire philosophy, which, obviously, requires closer articulation.

### *1.2 The World Citizen from Königsberg*

Kant's cosmopolitanism encompasses his own intellectual biography even when at first glance it seems otherwise because our philosopher was born in Königsberg, was raised there under modest circumstances, attended school and the university there, and found his first employment as house tutor nearby. He returned to his home university as a lecturer, devoted four decades of teaching and research there, and died in Königsberg where he was buried in the tomb devoted to professors in the cathedral/university church.

His biography seems to be anything but that of a world citizen: He lived in the sticks, was entirely comfortable there, declined job offers to other universities (1769 to Erlangen; 1770 to Jena), and not once even travelled to the political and intellectual, German centers of his time (Berlin, Jena, and Weimar). Nevertheless, he is not only a world citizen, but he provides the very paradigm of what it means to be a world citizen – to be sure a provocative paradigm because he demonstrated how one can live and think as a cosmopolitan without being a nomad or a “global player.”

First of all, Kant is a world citizen in the sense of a citizen who already in his lifetime was known in many parts of the world. Today, some 200 years after his death, he fulfills absolutely the notion of what cosmopolitan influence means. Kant is literally studied worldwide: not only everywhere in Europe but also in many countries of Asia, in North and South America, and on the Pacific rim.

When it comes to this kind of cosmopolitan reputation, most citizens, even philosophy professors, lack Kant's genius. However, every human being is capable of achieving the status of "small sibling" in terms of fame as well as his humanness – by means of integrity and a talented effort, everyone is capable of earning the respect of others as well as, in addition, a second respect that is just as important, self-respect.

It is often asserted that Kant led a pedantic life. In fact, he was entirely other than a dry, old bachelor. He filled only half of his day with lecturing and research. The other half he devoted to his social life that demonstrated him to be a world citizen in the public sense, namely, as an intelligent conversationalist who was eagerly sought out. However, Kant would not have become such an exceptional philosopher if he had only enjoyed the social life. In his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, he developed a philosophy of "gregarious well-being" in "combination ... with virtue" that encourages "true humanity" (VII 278).

In addition, Kant is a world citizen in a third sense capable of emulation by everyone. Thanks to a curiosity with respect to just about everything that can be found in life, in the world of politics, as well as science, Kant achieved for himself – so long as one brackets self-reflection – the status of what one could call a "the small sibling" of the Enlightenment (i.e., a broad knowledge of the world). This is the consequence of his insatiable reading: Kant read widely, much, quickly, and, nonetheless, intensively. For example, in order to study Rousseau's pedagogical novel *Émile* in peace, he locked himself into his room for several days (see Borowski 1804, 94). In addition to philosophical writings, he held discussions with merchant friends and read travel reports. When it came to cutting-edge research in the natural sciences, he was so familiar with it that he held lectures on the science – he even contributed his own, respectable, research reports:

For example, he explained the North African and Monsoon winds and published a theory for Saturn's rings as well as other galaxies. His reaction to the Lisbon earthquake was not Voltaire's mocking of Leibniz' defense of God. Rather, he undertook a purely rational explanation on the basis of subterranean transmitted explosions. Especially impressive is his purely scientific theory on the origin of the world. Under the motto, "Give me only matter, and I will build a world for you" (*Universal Natural History and Theory of Heaven*, I 229), he developed a rational explanation that was independent of any theological assumptions and that became known as the Kant-Laplace Theory, which obtained an important significance in astronomy.

Kant is in an even higher, fourth sense a world citizen; now in a truly philosophical sense. When it comes to every important building block of culture: (1) knowledge, (2) morality, (3) the unity of both the natural world and morality (i.e., freedom), (4) pedagogy, (5) *sensus communis*, including art, (6) self-evidently civic law, and not least (7) history, that is, for no less than seven regions of experience, he developed a cosmopolitan philosophy. This is the case not only with respect to Kant's own "subjective" judgment but also "objectively" according to the professional criteria of what makes for a cosmopolitan thinker. In addition, the unity of the seven cosmopolitan dimensions has its own cosmopolitan character.

In order to be considered a true cosmopolitan today, though, a thinker must satisfy two conditions. On the one hand, although he may be regional in a historical sense (in the case of Kant, he had above all western roots), that is, in order to be truly cosmopolitan, one must free oneself from regional roots. On the other hand, a cosmopolitan cannot erase all cultural differences but must, on the contrary, hold himself open to differences. A cosmopolitan philosophy combines, therefore – *first criterion*, intercultural applicability with a recognition of cultural differences. To be sure, the emphasis must be placed on the first ingredient: Philosophy is *cosmopolitan*, namely worthy of globalization, but not without political institutions.

With respect to the moment that still hasn't been addressed, politics, Kant has a moral concept. Initially, these are distinguished – *second criterion* – by means of three elements that are not indebted to politics in a material sense so that they are found already in the *Critique of Pure Reason*: (1) The challenge of a moral politics

consists in a natural condition – that of the character of a state of war (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 779 f.); (2) its moral conquest occurs by means of universalizable, fundamental principles that constitute a nation of laws (for Kant a republic); (3) whose goal consists in unconditional, in this sense eternal peace, that in addition qualifies in its moral character to be characterized as a “blessing” (*Perpetual Peace*, VIII 378). Kant presupposes that which can be denoted as the highest good: a congruence between (civic law) mores and (eudaimonistic) well-being.

A philosophy is in terms of its content, that is, with respect to its expressions, cosmopolitan when it combines its intercultural applicability with an openness to disparate cultures. It is in its procedures (i.e., methodically) cosmopolitan when it adheres to the named three formal elements of a moral politics. Finally, it is – *third criterion* – in a motivational sense cosmopolitan when it serves the common well-being of humanity in its entirety.

Because Kant’s philosophy, which yet needs to be demonstrated, adheres to all three criteria and because it is, additionally, not bound by the theme of civic law and politics, it contains a universal cosmopolitanism. Politics, though, doesn’t even constitute its center. Far more, it is its moral driving force that is the reason that not merely the individual elements but also their unity, in fact Kant’s entire thought from the foundation upward, is cosmopolitan.

### *1.3 An Epistemic World Republic*

Not all aspects of Kant’s cosmopolitanism are apparent from the beginning. When it comes to his philosophical development, he begins with knowledge and then combines it with the second driving force, the judicative critique. When we take a look at Kant’s intellectual biography, we discover the first, epistemic cosmopolitanism very early. Already in his first publication, later in *A new Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition*, one reads about conflict as well as judicative, dispute settlement. However, long before his first publication, on New Year’s 1765, Kant describes in a letter the philosophical world of his day by means of the three formal elements of moral politics (*Letters*, X 53; Nr. 32). He emphasizes “the destructive disunity among purported philosophers,”

concludes that “there is no common standard of measurement,” and demands as therapy an “effort to become unified” (see *Announcement of the Program of his Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765-1766*, II 308). In this respect, he proposed the cosmopolitan framework for a *Critique of Pure Reason* because all three elements of a moral politics are essential for its method.

The first *Critique* is cosmopolitan also in its content. Its fundamental principles, namely, are valid (because they are synthetically a priori) as generally, culturally and historically, independent. As it is stated in the “Architectonic of Pure Reason,” they (i.e., these fundamental principles) bring about that scientifically, common essence (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 879) that takes on the rank of an epistemic world republic because it consists of the commonwealth of all human reason. Because in this case, particularities of our species play no role (except that in order to understand, we require the perception of representations, consequently, the moment of receptivity), this world republic doesn’t create merely a global validity (valid for our globe) but a truly cosmopolitan, all-encompassing order for the entire universe. Further, as we have already said, the benefit of epistemic freedom governs cosmopolitanism so that a kind of epistemic, highest good is achieved, and the first *Critique* has in fact as its motivation, a cosmopolitan character.

Finally, one also finds a cosmopolitan moment in that, when it comes to the three existentially important themes (God, freedom, and immortality), all epistemic citizens are on an equal footing so that the thinker by profession, the philosopher, possesses “no higher or broader insight” than “the great (for us, respected above all) masses” (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B xxxiii). What is expected is only what is held in common and what corresponds to the necessary openness to cultural differences: With its synthetic a priori, the epistemic world republic claims applicability to all epistemic worlds insofar as their knowledge requires the two epistemological roots in accordance with Kant’s theory – not only the root of understanding but also the root of receptive perception.

“International law” (*ius gentium*) meant at the beginning (in Rome) less the law that regulated the international relations *among* peoples (in the sense of states) but rather the law that constituted de facto recognition of all peoples. In this respect, Kant’s working out of the synthetic a priori elements constitutes the character of an



epistemic people's rights. Whether we like it or not: politically, we're at first only nascent world citizens because a global lawful order is still being constructed. Epistemologically, though, we already live in an inter- and trans-culturally, shared world. Strikingly, what is epistemologically shared applies, according to Kant, to the sciences, mathematics, and physics. Because they're grounded in universally valid elements (the same mathematics), quantum theory all the way to relativity theory are applicable for the research and teaching of physics everywhere.

However, for Kant what is important is not the universal recognition of the sciences but the a priori grounding of those sciences. It is because of those common a priori conditions that we are all epistemic world citizens (i.e., that we're not only called to but, more importantly, capable of, a shared understanding of the world). In both respects (with respect to the challenge to and the capacity for a common understanding), everyone possesses the same faculty, that very reason that is in common to all people.

However, in the end Kant doesn't make a case for a universalism that is limited to our species. In contrast to an epistemic, species egocentrism, he defends an all-encompassing, universalism in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Were it to be the case that in other parts of the universe there were rational beings, they would be subject to the same requirements. In this respect there is the potential (for example, were it to happen that [we had] contact with them by means of prime numbers over radio signals) that they would share with us a common, epistemic world-republic.

For such a world-republic, though, philosophy offers only a very limited framework that establishes the right to cultural difference in both the sciences and political communities: On the one hand, it is epistemically different cultures (i.e., the different special sciences) that fill in the blanks of the framework according to their respective methods and criteria. On the other hand, this strict self-limitation cautions restraint itself with respect to the adequacies of the special sciences that includes both political philosophy and politics. The common legal order that is required today in our age of globalization needs to be seen within a very formal framework. The filling in of the blanks to this framework according to the standards of its respective disciplines and experience (as well as with respect to the interests of one's own culture) demands not merely philosophy but also politics. Yet, both

philosophy and politics should profile the framework of this common legal order only to the extent that the consequent, single community retains a strong defense of differences.

#### *1.4 Moral Cosmopolitanism*

The epistemic peace established by the first *Critique* serves two “persons” – directly knowledge but ultimately morality. Because both constitute the foundation for legal philosophy and a philosophy of freedom, this sequence is necessary: first, a world citizenry is necessary and, then, (what is more important to Kant) a moral, world citizenry. Only under the assumption that these two steps have been taken can the third form (i.e., cosmopolitanism in a more narrow, political sense) be established.

Parenthetically: Kant’s own intellectual biography conformed to this sequence, which supports my thesis that biographical and genuine philosophical cosmopolitanism are combined by Kant: Beginning in the early 1760s, our philosopher was concerned with the fundamental principles of morality. At the same time (1762-1764), according to the witness of his personal library, he was studying legal philosophy. Beginning with the summer semester of 1767, he even held courses in legal philosophy (“natural law”). Nevertheless, within his critical philosophy, he concerned himself first with the epistemic cosmos and only afterward with morality and, finally, with the legal cosmos (at least, thematically).

However, according to the heretical reading represented by this present study, the *Critique of Pure Reason* is concerned not so much with knowledge as it is with morality. The canon of the first part of the “Transcendental Method” justifies why the development of the third part’s motivation to cosmopolitanism is elevated to a teleological cosmopolitanism: The “final goal” of reason (i.e., the ultimate goal beyond epistemic peace) is dependent upon three elements among which the theoretical interest is limited but, in contrast, the moral-practical interest is limitless (because it is concerned with the freedom of the will, immortality of the soul, and the existence of God (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 826)).

To be sure, the *Critique of Pure Reason* begins first, thematically, with epistemic cosmopolitanism and only afterwards turns to the thematically second, moral cosmopolitanism because the second requires the insights of the first (e.g., the notion of the synthetic a priori) to establish the difference between receptive intuition, spontaneous understanding, and genuine elements of reason; and not least, to establish the conflict between nature and freedom that is the third antinomy. The *Critique of Practical Reason* follows this thematic structure, as well.

The connecting link between the epistemic world and the moral world is the notion of a “final goal.” This notion enhances within epistemic cosmopolitanism its cosmo-political character. Without a final goal, the knowing subject is no cosmo-polit; but only, as Kant would say, a cosmo-theoros [cosmo-observer]: Despite the Copernican Turn, he remains a mere observer of the cosmos to the extent that he stands over against it as a *spectator*. He becomes a member of the cosmos (actually, a fellow actor with the cosmos) only with the status as its final goal as a moral subject, namely, a morally accountable subject. It is precisely this status as a responsible person (and not first with the capacity to cross international borders or even with the establishment of global, political institutions) that elevates the person to the rank of cosmo-polit.

Kant’s concept and criterion for morality, the universally recognized, and from many moral philosophers embraced, categorical imperative, constitutes the principle of our second, moral cosmopolitanism. With this principle, Kant places methodological cosmopolitanism into practice. With its help, he contradicts radical, ethical relativism, which doubts the very possibility of a universally valid morality. Simultaneously, he pursues the formal, political accent of his cosmopolitanism. Even if not entirely so artfully as in the first *Critique*, he addresses the heretofore competing positions and overcomes what seems like their [conflictual,] natural state to the advantage of a [reconciled] moral, lawful state. The proper principle here, the moral law or categorical imperative, requires (as is well known) the universalization of principles, of maxims, which are valid for all persons in every culture – including those life-forms capable of action. Universalization is, then, similar to the synthetic a priori in the first *Critique*, truly cosmopolitan: its theme, morality, encompasses not only our species but the entire world.

The third, fundamental form of the categorical imperative, concerned with the kingdom of ends, strengthens, of course, moral cosmopolitanism. It remains, however, apolitical because it functions without lawful and national institutions. The kingdom of ends is, namely, a totality of all, not personal, but rational goals insofar as the totality is viewed as a systematic whole (*Groundwork*, IV 433). Political in the strictest sense is the “bonding of humanity by means of mere laws of virtue,” a bonding that Kant discusses in *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*, which he acknowledges to constitute an internal, ethical community not an external, juridical community (*Religion*, VI 94). One of the arguments for this community (also called the “kingdom of virtue” [see VI, 95]) follows that of methodological cosmopolitanism. It speaks of an ethical, natural condition, which will be replaced by means of mere laws of virtue by a community of “ethical-citizens” (see *ibid.*). In contrast to the usual, community of lawful-citizens, this ethical society is a “system of well-meaning persons” (VI 98), who are shaped not by the force of externally imposed laws but by strict, yet un-coerced, internal laws.

The following distinction is decisive: In accordance with his division of duties into lawful and virtuous duties, Kant identifies two kinds of moral perfection, which are applied to two fundamentally different subjects. In the case of lawful-morality, the human species is subject to the obligations established within the external parameters of each particular state; in the case of virtue-morality, in contrast, the human species is primarily a natural subject that must cultivate itself, internally, to be a world citizen; secondarily, the latter consists of the totality of those persons who constitute the kingdom of virtue. By means of the first set of duties, humanity is pressed into *coexistence* even when its community is shaped by moral laws; with the second, the community shaped by moral laws is subordinate to the individual’s *manner of thinking*, his own views. In the first case, all that is necessary are moral laws that allow others to perform their duty (i.e., a coercive, lawful duty); which, when it comes to our latter case, is supplemented by duties of virtue.

One also finds the kingdom of virtue, as well, in teleological cosmopolitanism with its kingdom of ends. Kant extends the thought of a highest good to a communal good and declares that this species of rational beings is determined “objectively by means of the idea of reason” for the “promotion of the highest good of a community” (VI 97).

Let's now return to the theme of moral cosmopolitanism! Unquestionably, it is demanding, even provocative, but also welcome once again in an age of globalization. The fact that Kant fundamentally sets aside all cultural particularities demonstrates, again, that he only at first glance appears to be a paradoxical person: a European world citizen. Kant is European because he reduces the commonalities of Europe to a common denominator -- above all, of Stoicism and Christianity in an epoch of European Enlightenment. Furthermore, he liberates the notion of these European elements from all Eurocentrism.

Two examples confirm this empirically: The forbidding of lying relevant to the law (deception) is found in all systems of law with which we are familiar. Furthermore, the ethical expectation to help those who are suffering does not occur just in Judaism and Christianity. Already in ancient Egyptian wisdom literature we find: "Help everyone! Set someone free whom you find in chains; be a guardian of the wretched. One calls good the man who does not close his eyes" (see Höffe 1998, Nr. 5). As well, the Koran says: "Pious is he who out of love for Allah gives his money to his dependents and the orphaned, the poor, and the son of [the false] way, the beggar, and those in prison" (ibid., Nr. 39).

The consequences of this observation are noteworthy: Kant exposes the philosophical foundations of a documentable, common inheritance of humanity, of a World Moral Heritage analogous to the World Cultural Heritage. Both of our examples, by the way, retain an openness to cultural differences. It is the particular order of penal law that decides, each in its own way, how deceit is to be defined according to the civic law and that decides the degree of deceit and how it is to be punished. The same is true for the obligation to aid others. Its philosophical grounds leave open the question who is to be helped in a situation of ambiguity (the parents, the children, the spouse) as well as the question of the extent to which the obligation to help others is to be stretched, whether it is to be done voluntarily, to the greater extent by taxes, or by force. In the end, it remains open whether certain circumstances in which help is not extended (and, of course, which circumstances) are subject to legal punishment.

### *1.5 Cosmopolitan Education*

In his lectures on pedagogy (*On Pedagogy*), Kant provides his basic thesis: “Children should not only be educated with respect to the current circumstances of humanity but also with respect to a possible, improved, future condition of the human species (i.e., with respect to the idea of humanity and its complete realization)” (IX 447). To this fundamental thesis is added a second that essentially constitutes an appraisal of the first: “The construction of a pedagogical plan must be cosmopolitical” (IX 448). What Kant means with these two theses is demonstrated by his summary (see *ibid.*):

The broad goal of all upbringing (“the development of natural capacities”) consists, viewed from the side of the parents, in terms of their children fitting into “the present world even if corrupt.” Parents “are generally concerned only that their children be successful;” they “are concerned for the family’s financial well-being.” The other nurturer, the princes, “view their subjects exclusively as means to their ends.” What Kant means here is not that the princes are concerned to misuse their subjects for their private advantage, but, sympathetic to the princes, he means the cultivation of their subjects in “service for the state.”

However, both with parents and princes, what Kant finds lacking is the final goal, “the world’s best and perfectibility.” Parents and princes are satisfied, as has been said, with (1) discipline: the “taming of wildness;” (2) acculturation: “the acquisition of slickness;” and (3) civility with respect to “manners, good behavior [in the sense of skills, competency], and a certain cleverness.” However, the ultimate, decisive goal that is directed toward nurturing perfectibility (i.e., that has as its aim moralization) is absent. Only when this ultimate goal is included can a person “not merely be skillful with respect to all kinds of goals” but acquire “the disposition ... that he only chooses good goals” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 450).

This task is also the concern of the second Critique’s methodology. It doesn’t develop moral philosophy’s method but the method for moral nurturing -- from which many German states today could benefit when it comes to their ethics-course offerings. The goal is extremely ambitious: “to bring about in us step by step the greatest and purist moral interest” with respect to the sanctity of duty (*Critique of*

*Pure Reason*, V 159). What Kant critics often overlook but is developed in the methodology of the *Doctrine of Virtue* [in the *Metaphysics of Morals*] is that this duty is accompanied by a hearty and cheerful nature (see *Doctrine of Virtue*, VI 484).

Why does Kant call this schooling cosmopolitan? It goes without saying that all private, even public, happiness is relativized by it. Our philosopher here is also not speaking of the well-being of a world government because political relationships are entirely absent in the *Pedagogy*. This notion of “cosmopolitan” evokes far more the categorical imperative: “Good goals,” it is said, “are those that necessarily are acknowledged by everyone and at the same time could be everyone’s goals” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 450).

Like he had in the canon of the first *Critique*, Kant directs his attention to the whole world in the *Pedagogy*. What is important to him is the panoramic view that overcomes every narrower, even a species-specific, perspective as it seeks the perspective of the whole (*pan*). At the same time, we can hear a resonance with the teleological meaning of the third *Critique* – although this notion has yet to be developed here. Education is cosmopolitan because it aims for “the world’s best” and out of it arises “everything that is good in the world” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 448) – indeed in that “world” that is not limited to humanity but includes the entire universe.

In his *Reflections on Anthropology* (Nr. 1170: XV 517), Kant contrasts the child of the earth and the world citizen. The child of the earth “is interested only in business deals and with those things insofar as they influence happiness. When it comes to the latter [the world citizen], humanity<sup>1</sup> is interested in the whole world, the origin of everything, their inner worth, and ultimate goals.” The accent belongs on the first element of the expression – on “cosmo” in cosmopolitan – here understood as cosmos, as the universe with respect to its ultimate, moral order.

This opinion reminds one of a passage from the *Logic* (IX 23 f.), which in turn has a counterpart in the architectonic of the first *Critique* (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B

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<sup>1</sup> „Humanity“ here means as is usual with Kant not the human species but that which distinguishes humanity as a moral being (see for example, *Groundwork*, IV 429 ff.; *Critique of Practical Reason*, V 87 f., 131; *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, V 335).

866 f.). On both occasions, Kant speaks of a world-concept in philosophy, a “sensus cosmicus” (*Logic*, IX 24), whereby the term “world,” otherwise than on other occasions, is not understood in the sense of “inclusive of all appearances” or as “in the transcendental understanding, as the absolute Totality that is inclusive of all existing things” (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 47). These definitions belong to the scholastic concept that is entirely contrary to philosophy although philosophy, to be sure, seeks a “system of knowledge” “as science” (B 866).

In the lectures *Metaphysics of Morals* (Vigilantius), Kant gives “school philosophy” a Greek title, which I haven’t found in the published works and is so unusual that an authoritative Greek dictionary, Lidell-Scott, doesn’t contain it. Kant here borrows a neologism, presumably from Christian Huygen’s text with the same name (1698): Whoever “concerns himself with nature with respect to the ever-increasing knowledge of theoretical observation” is called cosmo-theoros, which in German according to the *Opus postumum* would be a “world observer” (XXI 53), whom Kant contrasts with the cosmopolitan.

Kant does not mean by cosmopolitan, as I’ve already said, anything like a highly-educated, widely traveled, and urbane person, but, rather, someone who “observes nature around him in the practical sense of seeking to conform his own well-being in light of the whole” (XXVII, Vol. 2.1, 673). In contrast to cosmotheoros, devoted merely to knowledge, the cosmopolite distinguishes himself by his moral-practical attitude. Once again I stress, it is not the presence of political institutions that is decisive but that the individual is a person in the ambitious sense, which Kant spoke of at a pertinent point in the *Opus postumum*, as a “moral being.” The passage reads: “a man as (*cosmopolitan*) person (moral being) [is he] who is conscious of his freedom as a sensuous being (inhabitant of the world)” (XXI 31, §9). Again in contrast, the “*cosmotheoros* is the man who creates himself the elements of his world knowledge by means of which he constructs the world (as simultaneously a world occupant) in terms of his idea” (ibid.). (See XXI 101, where a contrast is made between “a principle of the forms [1] of personality in me and [2] the description of the world, *cosmotheoros* outside of me;” to this is added, thirdly, a system “of essences that are thought as constituting a system in me and outside of me.”)



The philosopher as world citizen does not simply push aside academic philosophy. Rather, he only relativizes it in that he is committed to the notion that all knowledge should be related “to the essential goals of human reason” (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 867; see *Logic*, IX 24). This relationship is not achieved merely as a product of mere modo theoretico. As is too frequently overlooked, the wisdom in the notion of philosophy as world-citizenship consists not only in doctrines [Lehre] but also consists in to teach [zu lehren] by example (*Logic*, IX 24). The paradigm for this “teaching by example,” one dares say, is Stoic wisdom. According to the first *Critique*, the ideal of pure reason (i.e., the idea in individuo) is named, as well, the “god-man in us” (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 596 f.).

The *Logic* passage continues: Reason’s essential goals are bundled in the famous questions for which “everyone is necessarily interested” (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 868) as the architectonic of the first *Critique* discusses. Because Kant wants to cover all of philosophy with these questions (“1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. What may I hope? 4. What is a human being?”), he represents explicitly when it comes to the goals of reason the thematic that is universal cosmopolitanism.

It needs to be underscored once more: Kant employs a paradox because cosmopolitan here is an apolitical concept. He calls “cosmopolites” not those persons who are capable of relativizing natural and cultural boundaries and who feel at home everywhere in the world. Rather, according to his provocative (because it is a moral) concept, a cosmopolite is someone who, according to the motto of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, serves the well-being of all of humanity. Once again in a very modern sense, Kant includes not only the present but also future generations and combines this view with a notion of development: The final goal of *Pedagogy* consists in a futurally, possible “moral” (IX 449) condition whereby not a civilized but a moral condition is meant. Methodically viewed, Kant is concerned with an “idea” that is offered in the form of a final goal that stands not only in contrast to but also above “the possible slow approximation of human nature” (ibid.).

Because the notion of the final end extends beyond the species, Kant’s educational plan contains the rarely noticed, *cosmo*-political perspective. At the same time the moral- is bound together with a teleological-cosmopolitanism. This is because as it says in the *Groundwork*, the individual does not exist merely “as an end in himself”

(IV 428). He is to be judged here on earth, as well, the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* adds, “as the final goal of nature” in light of which “all other natural things constitute a system of ends” (*Critique of the Power of Judgment*, V 429).

### *1.6 Further Cosmopolitanism and Résumé*

The claim for humanity as the final end of nature is easily suspected to be an example of species-egoism. Although according to Kant humanity has this rank as “the final end of creation” (*Critique of the Power of Judgment*, V 435), it is not as a biological species but as a moral being in possession of a special responsibility. Humanity as final end is not empowered according to a species-egoism but is committed to something with which no other being in the world is burdened – to a responsibility also for others, even for the non-human world. Simultaneously, a fourth theme is added to our cosmopolitan character: that unity of nature and freedom discussed in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* but already addressed in the first *Critique* where it is treated in the canon as the final purpose of speculative reason.

In the third *Critique* we encounter with the catch-word *sensus communis* a further, now fifth cosmopolitanism. Kant understands under this catch-word the “idea of a common sense,” more precisely, a capacity of judgment that along with Kant’s three, already named maxims – “1. Think for oneself; 2. Think from the perspective of the other; 3. Be consistent with oneself at all times” – as it were, applies to the entirety of human reason (*Critique of the Power of Judgment*, V 293 f.) (In the *Anthropology*, Kant labels this kind of thinking pluralism in contrast to egoism and qualified it as cosmopolitical, namely, not to take the whole world to be oneself, but to view and to act in the entire world as a world-citizen” [VII 130].) Yet, *sensus communis* is among other things responsible for the power of aesthetic judgment (for judgment with respect to beauty in nature and art), which adds art to the cosmopolitan character.

Cosmopolitan is “naturally” the region that usually stands in the middle of everything and, therefore, may already be waited for impatiently. There are two reasons, though, not to start with it because this region is dependent upon a

cosmopolitan, moral philosophy. The base legal principle that Kant develops, that principle which is generally compatible with freedom, takes up the moment of universalization in the categorical imperative (*Doctrine of Right* [*Metaphysics of Morals*], §5). This, in turn, presupposes a cosmopolitical, epistemological critique.

Europe is saturated with philosophical legal- and state-theories. What is amazing is that by all the great authors (from Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes and Locke all the way to Hegel) the theory of an international legal-community in terms of a peace-collective is glaringly missing. This gap is all the more astonishing because both notions are already found in the Greeks: Humans and their communities since the beginning of time have been concerned with their neighbors and have not always lived with them in “vain love and friendship.”

The concept “world citizen” (*kosmou polités*), presumably, goes back to Socrates; unquestionably, it is documented in his student, Diogenes of Snopce, and since Zenon of Krition, later Chrysipp, became a foundational concept for the Stoics. However, their philosophy is often apolitical. Even when it contains, as in the case of Zenon, certain political elements, they are by no means developed as in the case of the “national,” practical philosophy found in Plato and Aristotle. (For a concise overview, see Höffe 1999, Chap. 8.1.)

Despite the reflections, say, by Dante, Christian Wolff and Abbé St. Pierre, it is not until the high-point, and simultaneously turning-point, of the European Enlightenment that this gap is filled. A short treatise, Kant’s proposal for *Perpetual Peace* (1795), developed a so comprehensive and simultaneously, thoroughly thought-out theory that it remains to this day the decisive paradigm for all subsequent attempts. Whether philosophers, political scientists, or experts in international law, even economists – whoever wants a conscious theory appropriate to the problem of an international order of law is best served by becoming a student of Kant. The text is cosmopolitan on top of its primary theme of peace. Commencing with the challenge that every constitution should be a republican constitution, Kant’s claims are inter-culturally valid and at once open to cultural differences.

Only one aspect will be addressed here: In the second, definitive article dedicated to international law, Kant develops the challenging thought of his peace treatise and, perhaps, the most revolutionary part of his entire cosmopolitanism: the idea of a peace association of all nations (see *Perpetual Peace*, VIII 354 ff.).

Finally, cosmopolitanism emerges in Kant's philosophy of history already in the title of its most important treatise for there in his *Idea for a Universal History* he speaks of a "cosmopolitan purpose". Here, we undertake a résumé:

Obviously today, in an age of globalization a cosmopolitan philosophy is welcome. There, namely, where highly different cultures share the same world not merely "in principle" but in actual life visible to all, we need a thought that in a similar, visible manner is open to cultural differences. We don't need an ethnocentric but inter- and trans-culturally sound argumentation. Were one to bind the argumentation to a normative minimum for cultural coexistence, to the elementary conditions for a lawful state and democracy, it can be called a political and, in terms of a global view, cosmopolitan: world-citizenry.

In this respect, Kant's philosophy is a depiction of a multifaceted cosmopolitanism. Along with its uniting theme, morality, this cosmopolitanism makes the Königsberg philosopher so important for a globalized world, that someone from Tübingen can introduce his passion for the poet, Friedrich Hölderlin and adapt Hölderlin's words for philosophy: "You must study [Kant's ... cosmopolitanism], even when you have no money to buy a lamp and oil and only have time between midnight and the rooster's cry ..."